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The question is one of framing, en-framing, positioning, placement, and coercion of life and discussion.
It is raised at the intersection of human freedom and technology, of justice and war, and of thought and 
action. It spills over from the halls of academic philosophy and into the mainstream of public concern 
and news media headlines. The question is: Is Heidegger's philosophy connected to his support for the 
Nazi regime? Is he a Nazi philosopher? Is his philosophy fascist?
With the release of Heidegger's notebooks from the 30's and 40's, this is the question that everyone 
expects to be answered. But the question, innocent as it sounds, already forges a path toward certain 
possibilities of answering. We do not ask this question disinterestedly but with focused interest in the 
answer, because we suspect, even fear, that our own projects depend on it. What I am talking about 
here is the attempt to pathologize the philosopher for fear of infection—something I discuss in 
“Philosophy and Ethical Life.” Such a desire to coax the texts, the notebooks, and the life into offering 
up an answer, and not just any answer but our answer, is a kind of framing of the conversation, and of 
all the people involved, beginning with the very formulation of the question. This should be obvious to 
everyone, especially philosophers!
Surely if we are going to frame a person for their philosophy, or rather, frame a philosophy for the 
person, the minimal requirements of justice prescribe that we give the philosophy under suspicion a 
chance to respond to the charges. The objection will be that Heidegger was already given a chance to 
respond and he remained silent, and this silence now convicts him. Let me clarify that we are not here 
concerned with a defense of Heidegger any more than his conviction. The court has already ruled, and 
we are here in the aftermath, looking for the best way to move forward. It is now to the philosophy and 
the texts which are being implicated in the crimes, we ask: what of this framing? As we know, 
Heidegger talks often about framing, most explicitly in the 1953 lecture The Question Concerning 
Technology. The word is Gestell, and we find it, in the intersection of forces mentioned above, 
translated as "enframing," which suggests the meaning of ordinary objects like frames and bookshelves
but also something more abstract like orientation and positioning. Indeed, as the essence of modern 
technology, Heidegger wants to bring to mind both the threat of the phenomenon of enframing and at 
the same time its familiarity as something essential.
1 Originally appeared at http://notphilosophy.com/framing-heidegger-technology-and-the-notebooks/, March 9, 2014.
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The enframing that distinguishes technology is "the challenging claim that gathers man with a view to 
ordering the self-revealing as standing-reserve."2 In the following, I want to unpack this definition of 
enframing and see what it might say to our leading question and whether this is related to the framing 
of our discussion of Heidegger's notebooks. So in what way does technology challenge the human 
person and what is the ordering to standing-reserve? Says Heidegger, "the revealing that rules in 
modern technology is a challenging [Herausfordern], which puts to nature the unreasonable demand 
that it supply energy which can be extracted and stored as such." The challenge is the demand imposed 
upon nature to be converted and reduced to its potential as material ready for market, and this demand 
is everywhere felt in all aspects of life: "even the cultivation of the field has come under the grip of 
another kind of setting-in-order, which sets upon nature. It sets upon it in the sense of challenging it. 
Agriculture is now the mechanized food industry. Air is now set upon to yield nitrogen, the earth to 
yield ore, ore to yield uranium, for example; uranium is set upon to yield atomic energy, which can be 
unleashed either for destructive or for peaceful purposes." This demand, which later is used for both 
life-giving and life-taking, enframes nature for an immediate "expediting" that "is always itself directed
from the beginning toward furthering something else, i.e., toward driving on to the maximum yield at 
the minimum expense."3
So we see here that "enframing" as the challenge of technology makes a demand upon nature to gather 
itself up and be converted into a form most easily put into service, first, by the "setting-in-order" and 
putting in place of everything within the whole order, and second, by the industrial fabrication process. 
This gathering up of nature toward technological ends is the treatment of nature as standing-reserve, as 
live-stock. "Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately on hand, indeed to stand 
there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering. Whatever is ordered about in this way has its 
own standing. We call it the standing-reserve [Bestand]."4 One might at this point start to see a theme 
emerging around all the movements of this phenomenon of Gestell that Heidegger wants to describe as 
essential to technology. Enframing, challenging, demanding, ordering—what do these bring to mind? 
For one, a sense of control over nature and life. But Heidegger does not want us to think only of the 
control of technology as instrument in the mastery of material. Such instrumental control is derived 
from a more basic enframing as a way of being in and relating to the world, first explicitly 
demonstrated in the scientific attitude:
Modern science's way of representing pursues and entraps nature as a calculable coherence 
of forces. Modern physics is not experimental physics because it applies apparatus to the 
questioning of nature. The reverse is true. Because physics, indeed already as pure theory, 
sets nature up to exhibit itself as a coherence of forces calculable in advance, it orders its 
2 Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," in Basic Writings, ed. David Krell (HarperCollins: 1993), p. 324.
3 Ibid., 320-321.
4 Ibid., 322.
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experiments precisely for the purpose of asking whether and how nature reports itself when 
set up in this way.5
The implication is that the essence of technology is to be found in something previous to the 
appearance of modern technology. It is found, for Heidegger, in this phenomenon of enframing 
(Gestell) which constitutes a fundamental mode of human being toward the world, wherein nature 
exists to be at the disposal of the ordering and processing toward a maximized yield—with no 
remainder, that is, a total conversion of life into standing-reserve. In the total demand of enframing, 
there is no subtlety: all possibilities are framed into a singular outlook. It may be clear now that the 
thematic at work in this enframing, what implicitly runs through Heidegger's discussion of technology, 
joining all these aspects together, is force. And to not leave any doubt, it is a force against life yet 
arising from within life itself; it is both our doing and our un-doing.
It is important to listen a bit to what Heidegger says about framing because it is this that is at stake: the 
framing of his thought and thus the framing of enframing. We're overdue for an example to clarify the 
relation between this enframing and the original question at stake in the current discussion. In “Release 
of Heidegger’s ‘Black Notebooks’ Reignites Debate Over Nazi Ideology,”6 Paul Hockenos pits critics 
of Heidegger against his, mostly French, "loyalists" concerning racist comments in his wartime 
notebooks.  This is a common framing of the discussion, by the way: that the whole of Heidegger's 
philosophy is infected by fascism is obvious to all except the French, and any attempt to add subtlety to
our interpretation of the Heideggerian texts can be dismissed by appeal to this national-ethnic 
category.7 That topic will have to be taken up at a later time or by someone else. Here I want to draw 
our attention to another type of framing in this article. After mentioning the "French" objection to 
Trawny's (the editor of the notebooks) statements about the connection between Nazi racism and 
Heidegger's philosophy, Hockenos writes:
To be sure, Heidegger’s critics had already assembled a significant trove of evidence 
against him. For one, Heidegger was elected rector of the University of Freiburg in early 
1933, just a few months after Adolf Hitler came to power. Heidegger joined the Nazi party 
shortly after that and remained a member until the end of the war, even though he stepped 
down from the rectorship in early 1934. As late as 1949, he talked about the "fabrication of 
corpses in gas chambers and death camps."
This paragraph claims to be discussing "a significant trove of evidence against Heidegger," which then 
leads to the next section of the article that intends to show Heideggerian concepts that overlap with 
fascism. What immediately grabs our attention in this paragraph is naturally the report that Heidegger 
5 Ibid., 326.
6 http://chronicle.com/article/Release-of-Heidegger-s/144897/. February 24, 2014.
7 See https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/derbyshire/heidegger-in-france-nazism-and-philosophy/ and 
http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/derbyshire/heidegger-and-nazism-redux-error-and-apology/.
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talked about the fabrication of corpses in gas chambers and death camps. A shocking phrase by itself, 
even without its original surrounding sentence. The indifferent force of the fabrication imposed on 
what we know to be millions of human beings, like a machine merely processing material for market, 
forces an emotional response. We want to know: what about this fabrication? Did Heidegger defend it? 
Did he apologize for it? This phrase is an egregious and unashamed journalistic cliffhanger, for 
Hockenos offers no further comment on nor context for, not even a citation to the source of, this 
"fabrication of corpses" that the reader feels has the potential to reveal so much about Heidegger and 
about the question at stake.
If anything, the reader is left to infer that, situated as it is in the article between "a significant trove of 
evidence against him" and the section headlined Overlap With Fascism, Heidegger must have 
employed this phrase with the same indifferent, unapologetic force that fabricated the corpses. To frame
the discussion of Heidegger's texts in this way, by denying the reader context at just the moment when 
they most need the text of the quotation, does not encourage a healthy discussion. As it happens, 
perhaps for a reason, the quote in question comes from the original 1949 version of the same lecture on 
the enframing nature of technology that we looked at above. In the interest of adding con-text to this 
debate (no, I'm not French), that is, in the interest of understanding the texts that are being quoted, and 
as a resource for the journalists that will no doubt refer to this shocking phrase, I offer an extended 
quote from this earlier lecture on technology and framing. After discussing the same challenging, 
positioning and ordering of nature and human being that we have seen defines enframing, Heidegger 
says:
What does "to place, position, set" [stellen] mean? Let us first consider it from production. 
The carpenter produces a table, but also a coffin. What is produced, set here, is not 
tantamount to the merely finished. What is set here stands in the purview of what 
concernfully approaches us. It is set here in a nearness. The carpenter in the village does not
complete a box for a corpse. The coffin is from the outset placed in a privileged spot of the 
farmhouse where the dead peasant still lingers. There, a coffin is still called a "death-tree" 
[Totenbaum]. The death of the deceased flourishes in it. This flourishing determines the 
house and farmstead, the ones who dwell there, their kin, and the neighborhood.
Everything is otherwise in the motorized burial industry of the big city. Here no death-trees 
are produced.
A peasant positions his ox to drag fallen tree trunks out of the forest onto the path. He does 
not place the ox here just so that it would stand somewhere. He positions what is placed 
here in such a manner that it is directed toward application.
Men and women must place themselves in a work service. They are ordered. They are met 
by a positioning that places them, i.e., commandeers them. One places the other. He retains 
him. He positions him. He requires information and an accounting from him. He challenges
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him forth. Let us now enter into the meaning of this word "to position, place, set" so as to 
experience what comes to pass in that requisitioning through which an inventory arises [der
Bestand steht] and is thus a standing reserve.
To place, position, set means here: to challenge forth, to demand, to compel toward self-
positioning. This positioning occurs as a conscription [die Gestellung]. The demand for 
conscription is directed at the human. But within the whole of what presences, the human is
not the only presence approached by conscription.
A tract of land is imposed upon, namely for the coal and ore that subsists in it. The 
subsistence of stone is presumably already conceived within the horizon of such a 
positioning and even only conceivable in terms of this. The subsisting stone that, as such, is
already evaluated for a self-positioning is challenged forth and subsequently expedited 
along. The earth's soil is drawn into such a placing and is attacked by it. It is ordered, 
forced into conscription. This is how we understand the word "ordering" [bestellen] here 
and in what follows.
Through such requisitioning [Bestellen] the land becomes a coal reserve, the soil an ore 
depository. This requisitioning is already of a different sort from that whereby the peasant 
had previously tended his field. Peasant activity does not challenge the farmland; rather it 
leaves the crops to the discretion of the growing forces; it protects them in their thriving. In 
the meantime, however, even the tending of the fields [die Feldbestellung] has gone over to
the same requisitioning [Be-Stellen] that imposes upon the air for nitrogen, the soil for coal 
and ore, the ore for uranium, the uranium for atomic energy, and the latter for orderable 
destruction. Agriculture is now a mechanized food industry, in essence the same as the 
production of corpses in the gas chambers and extermination camps, the same as the 
blockading and starving of countries, the same as the production of hydrogen bombs.8
Requisitioning and conscription, positioning and imposition, ordering and conscription, all related to 
the Gestell (enframing from the 1953 lecture) and to the activity stellen (the putting and placing) which
gives meaning to all these derived words. In the final paragraph above, this Gestell appears as a force 
both near and against life. To what end does this force aim? Heidegger defines "force" as "that which 
imposes upon something so that something else follows from it in an assessable manner."9 The aim of 
the ordering force is nothing in particular, but it orders for the sake of total order itself. Picking up 
further along in the lecture:
Again we ask: where does the chain of such requisitioning finally run out to? It runs out to 
nothing; for requisitioning produces nothing that could have, or would be allowed to have, 
a presence for itself outside of such positioning. What is ordered is always already and 
8 Heidegger, "Positionality," in Bremen and Freiburg Lectures: Insight Into That Which Is and Basic Principles of 
Thinking (Indiana University Press: 2012), 26-27. I recommend anyone with interest in this discussion to read this 
lecture and make up their own mind.
9 Ibid., 39.
5
Framing Heidegger Osborn
always only imposed upon to place another in the succession as its consequence. . . The 
Rhine river, for example, is there only as something ordered in the requisitioning just 
mentioned. The hydroelectric plant is not built in the Rhine river, but rather the river is built
into the power plant and is what it is there due to the power plant's essence. In order to 
somewhat gauge the monstrosity that reigns here, let us attend only for a moment to the 
opposition expressed in the two names: The Rhine, built into the power plant—"The 
Rhine," as said in the artwork of Hölderlin's eponymous hymn.10
Heidegger is talking, then, about an all-encompassing ordering that converts the very essence of 
something—the land, the river, the being—into positioning in the chain of technological process. Such 
process "has wrestled away all that presences and placed it into complete orderability, whether what 
presences in the particular case is especially positioned or not. This violence of requisitioning, 
outstripping everything, drags the particular acts of requisitioning only further along behind itself."11 It 
is a self-replicating process of conversion of everything into orderability, and it extends to all forms of 
life, especially to humans as both masters and victims of the requisitioning forces:
The human is thereby an employee of requisitioning. Humans are thus, individually and in 
masses, assigned into this. The human is now the one ordered in, by, and for the 
requisitioning. . . Requisitioning not only assaults the materials and forces of nature with a 
conscripting. Requisitioning assaults at the same time the destiny of the human. The 
essence of the human is imposed upon to collaborate in carrying out the requisitioning in a 
human manner. Requisitioning comes upon nature and history, all that is, and in every way 
that whatever presences is. What presences is imposed upon as such for orderability and 
thus represented in advance as something steady, whose standing essences from 
requisitioning.12
The requisitioning (Bestellen) that assaults and does violence to life, and of which the "production of 
corpses" is an example, is what the enframing (Gestell) essence of modern technology promotes. Here 
in this 1949 lecture, the word is "positionality," a translation of the same Gestell that is translated as 
enframing in the 1953 text. "Positionality essences as the plundering drive that orders the constant 
orderability of the complete standing reserve. What we thereby think as positionality is the essence of 
technology." The language of coercion and force now transitions into that of drive and machine, but, 
Heidegger emphasizes, the common conception of modern technology as constituted by machines 
should be reversed.13 It is rather the essence of technology as the enframing of the whole of nature as 
stock standing by for requisition that drives the world toward the total orderability of machination. And
elsewhere Heidegger describes machination as a mode of being itself that distorts the essence of being 
10 Ibid., 27.
11 Ibid., 28.
12 Ibid., 29-30.
13 Ibid., 31-32.
6
Framing Heidegger Osborn
by reducing all possibility to the potential for making.14 In summary, having traced technology to its 
essence as enframing, which appears as both a demand arising from and a threat against life, 
technology reveals being as machine.
I give these extended quotations to add depth to the type of framing of philosophy that happens in 
reporting on things like the Heideggerian notebooks and the relation between the philosopher's thought 
and life. It is always difficult to ask the question of the bottom line or final say with Heidegger. In the 
same way that life in its moment of being lived offers no reassurance about the final judgment, so with 
the philosophical text the goal of which is to describe those experiences which later inform the 
prescriptions we make about how to live. I certainly do not want to force Heidegger to say something 
he did not. I can say one thing, though, that should be clear on most readings of these texts. If 
Heidegger has equated, in essence, the deaths of millions of Jews by the Nazi regime to the conversion 
of agriculture into a mechanized industry, to the production of the hydrogen bomb, to the imposition of 
forces against nature, to the ordering of human beings into a standing-reserve, and to the machination 
that distorts being, in short, to the enframing essence of technology that requisitions, conscripts, 
positions, orders and imposes—and I believe this is indeed the equation being made in the paragraph in
question—then I find it difficult to argue for any other conclusion than the following. Despite any 
allegiance he gave to the regime in 1933, despite any enduring belief in the principles of National 
Socialism as he saw them or wanted to see them, and despite his refusal to take responsibility in the 
manner of apology, the Holocaust was for Heidegger the furthest thing from a celebration of Being that 
one can imagine, representing a categorical lack of understanding of human freedom; and thus it is not 
"compatible," if we must use the word, with his "philosophy." Being totally withdrawn, absent in the 
sense of the greatest of that which is possible for the human in their being to be, denied. The natural 
and human forces of life squeezed through the technological machinery of war. The Jew was deprived 
of a natural, human death, and thus of life, by being forced into death by technological conversion. It is,
indeed, an assault upon humanity and a violence done to the beings that were already present there with
their own purposes for their lives.
If we take this "fabrication of corpses" as a reduction of human life to lower forms with which it is 
compared, then I believe we have not yet read the rest of the lecture and are instead already imposing 
upon it the biological anti-Semitism that we want to find. On the contrary, in this comparison, the land, 
soil, air, agriculture and hungry peoples are raised up to the highest value and to the greatest urgency: 
that of life and the possibility of life ripped away. All these things are, for the purposes of the texts at 
hand, examples of the "extreme danger" posed by the technology that "challenges forth into the 
frenziedness of ordering that blocks every view into the propriative event of revealing and so radically 
14 See Heidegger on machination in Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event) (Indiana University Press: 2012), 
beginning on page 99.
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endangers the relation to the essence of truth."15 This blocking of the view of truth is a blocking of that 
which "lets man see and enter into the highest dignity of his essence," for the enframing of technology 
"threatens to sweep man away into ordering as the ostensibly sole way of revealing, and so thrusts man 
into the danger of the surrender of his free essence."16
Heidegger insists, though, that this is not a critique in the sense of a disapproval of technology in 
general. In recognizing the essence of technology as the enframing force that threatens freedom, a 
"saving power" is necessarily revealed: "the essential unfolding of technology gives man entry into 
something which, of himself, he can neither invent nor in any way make. For there is no such thing as a
man who exists singly and solely on his own."17 What enframing gives us entry into is the 
understanding of our own essence through the challenge of technology, because "it is technology itself 
that makes the demand on us to think in another way what is usually understood by 'essence.'"18 And so,
"the essence of technology is in a lofty sense ambiguous. Such ambiguity points to the mystery of all 
revealing, i.e., of truth." As a way in which we ourselves are, enframing is not merely an external threat
as from the machines and tools that give technology its utility, but it is first a distorting of being that 
positions us toward our own possibility for machination. Yet in this very distortion, even because of it, 
the other possibilities that have been blocked off are made all the more clear, and in this way we come 
to an understanding of our essential being and our greater possibilities. Thus, the task in such a 
situation between extreme danger and life-giving potential is that we "watch over" the rise of 
technology: "catching site of the essential unfolding in technology, instead of merely gaping at the 
technological. So long as we represent technology as an instrument, we remain transfixed in the will to 
master it. We press on past the essence of technology."19 That is, to understand technology in its 
essence, not merely in its individual manifestations (this computer here, that machine there), is to 
understand us and watch over our own requisitioning demand and our own enframing drive toward 
total orderability. The advance of technology challenges us toward a responsibility beyond standing by 
in observance of everything new, as mere spectators conscripted in the service of its march, and beyond
the will to master being-as-machination.
Is this "watching over" the same responsibility we find, in the writings from the 20's, at the intersection 
of Dasein's freedom, capacity-to-be, and capacity-to-be-with? It seems like it could be:
As ecstatic self-projection on its own capacity-for-being, freedom understands itself from 
out of this capacity and at the same time holds this capacity before itself as responsibility. 
Freedom is consequently the origin of anything like ground. We can make this pithy by 
saying freedom is the metaphysical essence of transcending, existing Dasein. But freedom 
15 Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," 338.
16 Ibid., 337.
17 Ibid., 337.
18 Ibid., 335.
19 Ibid., 337.
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is qua transcendental freedom toward ground. To be free is to understand oneself from out 
of one's own capacity-to-be; but "oneself" and "one's own" are not understood individually 
or egoistically, but metaphysically. They are understood in the basic possibilities of 
transcending Dasein, in the capacity-to-be-with with others. . .20
Such responsibility would challenge, first and foremost, those who, in the midst of the totalitarian 
march and the technological conversion of life into death, did not speak up, even though they saw the 
threat to Dasein's free capacities to be, be with, and understand. Was this mention of the "production of 
corpses" in 1949 an attempt to answer the challenge? Is Heidegger here fostering the saving power 
through the understanding of the essence of technology and the danger posed to our very being?
But what help is it to us to look into the constellation of truth? We look into the danger and 
see the growth of the saving power.
Through this we are not yet saved. But we are thereupon summoned to hope in the growing 
light of the saving power. How can this happen? Here and now and in little things, that we 
may foster the saving power in its increase. This includes holding always before our eyes 
the extreme danger.21
Holding the danger before our eyes. But—we can hear Heidegger saying in a footnote that he never 
wrote—not merely gaping at the danger, lest our very gazing conscript us into the total orderability of 
enframing that holds us back and blocks us off. We have seen how the lectures on technology might 
respond to our opening question and the framing of the discussion of Heidegger, and now his own texts
challenge him. But the saving power is of no use when it arrives late, so our interpretation of the 
"production of corpses" now directs its challenge to us, first of all, because it asks us to stop marching 
and to question the unquestioning technological positivism that all areas of thought, work, and politics 
now require; and second, because it means that responsibility does not end, as Derrida says, in that 
European black forest where "the shadow of big trees" and "the shelter of their silence" nourished the 
terrible political ideology.22 The burden of this history extends to wherever the challenge of enframing, 
the technological conversion of life into death, and the ordering of beings into mere stock-value 
marches on. As such, and in an ironic twist to this story, it is Heidegger who from his texts makes a 
final call to not surrender to the fateful march of being toward machination and thus to not forget the 
Holocaust, for the same technology that converts the coal into energy to run a factory can be used to 
convert the animal into live-stock and the human into corpse.
Some might say that none of this matters—the enframing and how we frame Heidegger—because no 
one has read the notebooks yet, and the notebooks will reveal all. I disagree. The notebooks matter, and
their contents cannot be excused. But to pretend that a notebook holds the key to magically unlocking 
20 Heidegger, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic (Indiana University Press: 1984), 213-214.
21 Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," 338.
22 See Derrida, Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question (University of Chicago Press: 1989), 109.
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the historical person with a hidden agenda behind the whole philosophy in order to stamp it all 
"fascist" and move on, would be an egregious imposition on the texts of a desire for total orderability. 
Such an attempt to once and for all "solve" the system underlying Heidegger's text is to fail to keep 
watch over the enframing force that conscripts beings toward a totalitarian machination of what is. 
What is is life, and life exceeds the requisitioning force of Gestell, the driving march of machination, 
and the anchoring weight of its worst moments.
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